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Salama: Is It So Easy a Monkey Can Do It: Joint Works and the Unintended

NOTE
IS IT SO EASY A MONKEY CAN DO IT?:
JOINT WORKS AND THE UNINTENDED
COLLABORATOR
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year was 2011.1 The place: North Sulawesi, Indonesia. 2 A
took his weapon'
of choice and ventured into the
wilderness looking for his subject. 6 With the help of a tour guide, David
Slater followed a troop of the rare crested black macaques for three days,
hoping to snap a few unique pictures.' The macaques were inquisitive
creatures, and as such their interest in the objects Slater was carrying
prompted them to venture closer to Slater, most likely in hopes of
figuring out what his shiny, reflective things do. 8 In time, they did.9
photographer'

1. Andres Guadamuz, Can the Monkey Selfie Teach Us Anything About Copyright Law?,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb. 2018), http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2018/01/article-

0007.html.
2. Id.
3.

David J Slater, DJS PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/davidjslater.htm

(last visited Nov. 18, 2019). David J. Slater is a British wildlife photographer who is recognized as
being able "to achieve award winning images" of wildlife and its surrounding nature.Id.
4. Guadamuz, supra note 1. Slater's equipment included a camera, a wide-angle lens, and a

tripod. Id.
5. Samuel Osborne, 'Monkey Selfie' Case: Photographer Wins Two Year Legal Fight
Against Peta over the Image Copyright, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2017, 10:30 AM)
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/monkey-selfie-david-slater-photographer-peta
-copyright-image-camera-wildlife-personalities-macaques-a7941806.html. Slater was visiting the

Tangkoko Reserve, a national park in Indonesia. Id.
6. David
J.
Slater,
Monkey
Selfie,

DJS

PHOTOGRAPHY

(Sept.

2016),

http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/monkeyselfie.htm. The reason Slater visited this specific island of
Indonesia was to photograph the crested black macaques. Id. He knew these animals were
extraordinary, but also knew they were severely threatened, and hoped that photographing and then
publicizing their plight would help spread awareness to conservation efforts. Id.
7. Steven Morris, Shutter-Happy Monkey Turns Photographer, THE GUARDIAN (July 4,
2011,2:34PM),https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/julO4/shutter-happy-monkey-photograp
her.

8. Id.
9. Id.

215
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Though Slater is an accomplished, award-winning photographer,"
and though he spent an ample amount of time taking pictures of the
monkeys, none of these photos quite panned out the way Slater hoped
they would." Unbeknownst to him, he needed help; he needed Naruto.12
Narutol 3 is one of the macaques that Slater had befriended during his
observation of these beautiful creatures.14 He is curious, mischievous,
and imaginative, seemingly possessing the skills of a great
photographer." With Slater strategically leaving his equipment out,
Naruto's magnetic pull to the lens led him to finally showcase his
talents.6He and the rest of the members of his troop began jumping all
17
Then, Naruto
over the equipment, unsure what result would follow.
1 While his friends scurried away in fear, Naruto was
clicked the button.
in awe of the sound it made. Naruto continued to click the button again
and again, unknowingly baring his teeth for what would become one of
the most astounding, once-in-a-lifetime photos that ever captured such
an expression of pure joy and self-awareness in an animal: the infamous
"monkey selfie." 2 0

The photograph became an instant phenomenon, promising
financial success for Slater." However, such possible financial success
was short-lived when Slater's copyright ownership of the photo was
questioned. 2 2 Wikipedia2 3 began using Slater's photo without his
10. David J Slater, supra note 3. His awards include ninth place out of fifty-nine competitors
in the NBC Most Important & Arresting Image of the Decade, USA 2009 and Winner of the Animal
Behavior section of the British Wildlife Photography Awards, 2009, among others.Id.
11. Guadamuz, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Jennifer S. Holland, For These Monkeys, It's a Fight for Survival, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
Mar. 2017, at 90, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/03/macaques-monkeysindonesia-endangered-pet-trade. The macaque in question was recognized to be "Naruto" by
primatologist Antje Englehardt, of England's Liverpool John Moores University. But see Slater,
supra note 6 (claiming that the macaque was actually a female named Ella). For the purposes of this
Note, the macaque will be referred to as Naruto.
14. Morris, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Guadamuz, supra note 1.
17. Morris, supranote 7.
18. Id. The "button" refers to the shutter-release button on the camera. Id.
19. Id.
20. Guadamuz, supra note 1.
21. Olivier Laurent, Monkey Selfie Lands Photographerin Legal Quagmire, TME (Aug. 6,
2014),http://time.com/3393645/monkey-selfie-lands-photographer-in-legal-quagmire.
22. Zachary M. Seward, Who Owns This Monkey's Selfie?, QUARTz (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://qz.com/245627/who-owns-this-monkeys-selfie/#.
23. Matthew Sparkes, Wikipedia Refuses to Delete Photo as 'Monkey Owns It', TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 6, 2014, 12:03 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11015672/VikipediaWikipedia is run by the United States
refuses-to-delete-photo-as-monkey-owns-it.html.
organization, Wikimedia. Id. Wikimedia has an online collection of millions of images and videos
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permission; its editors believed that the photo was in the public domain
because, "as the work of a non-human animal, there is no human author
in whom copyright is vested." 2 4 Slater was poised to go to court and
assert his copyright, but legal experts believed that he would not win.2 5
To some intellectual property experts,26 Slater's claim to copyright
seemed "ridiculous" 27: "To have copyright, you've got to create
something; it has to be an expression of your personality. [The monkey
selfie is] not." 28

Slater had not yet formally put this issue before the courts in the
form of a lawsuit when the United States Copyright Office ("USCO")
weighed in on the matter in 2014.29 The USCO stated that "[b]ecause
copyright law is limited to 'original intellectual conceptions of the
author,' the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a
human being did not create the work."3 0 Consequently, that means that
"[t]he Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or
plants."" The USCO's proclamation seems like a simple concept, and
the premise that an animal could ever own a copyright even seems a
little comical. 32 However, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
("PETA") did not think such a proposition was a laughing matter.3 3 One
that are free to use by anyone online; this collection is known as the "Wikimedia Commons." Id.
Editors soon added the monkey selfie to the Wikimedia Commons, and the picture can still be found
there
today.
Id.;
see
also
Category: Monkey
Selfie,
WKIMEDIA
COMMONS,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wikilCategory:Monkey-selfie (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
24. Laurent, supra note 21 (quoting Wikipedia's group of editors).

25. Id.
26. Charles Swan, SWAN TURTON, http://swanturton.com/people/charles-swan (last visited
Nov. 18, 2019). Charles Swan, head of a London-based Swan Turton's Photography & Visual Arts
Groups, is one of the experts that spoke out on the monkey selfie matter. Id.
27. Laurent, supra note 21 (quoting Charles Swan).
28. Id. (quoting Charles Swan, who believed that the monkey selfie was not an expression of

Slater's personality).
29. Samuel Gibbs, Monkey Business: Macaque Selfie Can'tBe Copyrighted, Say US and UK,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/22/
monkey-business-macaque-selfie-cant-be-copyrighted-say-us-and-uk.
30. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT PRACTICE § 306
(3d ed., rev. 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]).
31. Id. (quoting COMPENDIUM, supra note 30, §313.2). Interestingly enough-and most likely
a result of the debate surroundings the monkey selfie-the most recent version of the USCO's
compendium specifically clarifies that "[a] photograph taken by a monkey" does not qualify for
copyright protection. COMPENDIUM, supra note 30, § 313.2.
32. See generally Sarah Jeong, Wikipedia's Monkey Selfie Ruling Is a Travesty for the
World's
Monkey
Artists,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
6,
2014,
4:56
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/06/wikipedia-monkey-selfie-copyright-artis
ts (satirizing the fact that a monkey could ever own a copyright by stating that being a photographer
is difficult, but being a monkey who is a photographer is even more difficult).

33. PETA Sues Nature Photographerin Hopes of Giving a MONKEY Copyright Ownership of
Selfie, DAILY

MAIL

(Sept. 23,

2015,

3:51

PM),
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of the lawyers representing PETA 34 took the stance that the USCO's
policy "is only an opinion."3 5 Subsequently, PETA, on behalf of Naruto,
3 6
sued Slater for copyright ownership of Naruto's selfie.
Putting aside the complicated issue of Naruto's primal nature, the
37
question of who owns a photograph generally has a simple answer. The
USCO has specified that "[t]he owner of the 'work' is generally the
photographer or, in certain situations, the employer of the
photographer."

3

Therefore, whoever presses down on the shutter button

would normally be considered the copyright owner of the resulting
image. 39 While the rule is simple, when applying it to the case of the
monkey selfie, the law completely overlooks the fact that the photo was
taken as a result of Slater's efforts.4 The selfies were the consequence
of Slater's "ingenuity in coaxing the monkeys into pressing the shutter
while looking into the lens." 4 1 As Slater stated, "[i]t wasn't serendipitous
monkey behavior ... it required a lot of knowledge[,] . .. a lot of
42
perseverance, sweat and anguish, and all that stuff." He created the

conditions that allowed the photograph to be created: Why should he not
own the copyright for his work?4 3
3245807/PETA-sues-nature-photographer-hopes-giving-MONKEY-copyright-ownership-selfie.ht
ml [hereinafter PETA Sues Nature Photographer].

34.

PETA Appeals 'Monkey Selfie' Case on Grounds That Monkey Owns Copyright, PETA

(July 11, 2017), https://www.peta.org/blog/peta-appeal-monkey-selfie-case-grounds-monkey-ownscopyright. Jeffrey Kerr was general counsel for PETA in the lawsuit between Naruto and Slater. Id.
35. PETA Sues Nature Photographer,supranote 33 (quoting Kerr).

36.

Id.

37.

U.S. Copyright Office, Can I Use Someone Else's Work? Can Someone Else Use Mine?,

COPYRIGHT.Gov, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-fairuse.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (holding that
the photographer-the person who pressed down on the shutter-button to capture a picture of his

subject-was the author of the photograph and thereby retained copyright protection of his work);
see also Laurent, supra note 21 ("If a monkey takes a picture, that can be considered an author's
intellectual creation. The fact that [David Slater] owns the camera has nothing to do with [holding

the copyright to the photograph].").
40. Julia Carrie Wong, Monkey Selfie PhotographerSays He's Broke: 'I'm Thinking ofDog
Walking', THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2017, 8:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/20
17/jul/12/monkey-selfie-macaque-copyright-court-david-slater.

41.

Id.

42. Id. For a firsthand account of Slater's experience with the monkeys, see David J. Slater,
Sulawesi Macaques, DJS PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/original-story.html

(last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
43. Id. As aforementioned, Burrow-Giles held that photographs are copyrightable works.
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61. However, when discussing why the photographer owned his
photograph, the court did not so much linger on the fact that the photographer pressed the button,
but rather, it focused on the originality, intellectual production, thought, and conception the

photographer put into creating the photograph:
[T]he photograph in question ... is a "useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and
graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the same . .. entirely from his own original

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/8
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Moreover, what if there were only human contributors to the
photograph, as opposed to animal contributors?" Such a debate revealed
itself when the infamous Ellen DeGeneres selfie was taken at the
2014 Oscars45 :
It's not clear ... who owns the copyright ... [was it] Ellen DeGeneres,
who coordinated the photo? Bradley Cooper, who actually took it?
Samsung, which made the camera and played a role in arranging the
stunt? Or perhaps the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences,
which hosts the Oscars? And does it matter that the selfie was
distributed on Twitter, a social media platform? 6
Using the default rule stated above, Bradley Cooper-the one who
physically pressed the shutter button-would own the copyright, even
though all he did, in reality, was press a button.4 7 Yet, neither Bradley
Cooper nor his primal counterpart, Naruto, clicked the button with the
intent of creating a copyrightable work of authorship. 4 8 Naruto is only a
monkey, and his selfie was a result of Naruto's pull towards the
reflective camera lens and his enjoyment of the sound the shutter made
when he clicked it;4 9 similarly, Bradley Cooper only pushed the camera
button because his arm is longer than Ellen DeGeneres's.o How can
their lack of intent coupled with the simple act of pressing down on a
shutter button compare with the lengths that Ellen DeGeneres and David
Slater went through to actually create the circumstances that made the
photo a success?"

mental conception, to which he have visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by
plaintiff, he produce the picture in suit."
Id. at 60. Undoubtedly, the court was focused on the conditions the photographer constructed to be
able to produce such a picture; should the same not be focused on for Slater? Id.
44. See, e.g., Philip Bump, Paging Bradley Cooper's Lawyers: He Might Own Ellen's
Famous Oscar Selfie, THE ATLANTIc (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2014/03/paging-bradley-coopers-lawyers-you-might-own-ellens-famous-oscar-selfie/358758.
45. Id.
46. Seward, supra note 22.
47. Bump, supra note 44.
48. See infra Part III for the definition of "intent."
49. Laurent, supra note 21.
50. Bump, supra note 44; Ellen DeGeneres (@TheEllenShow), TwrTrER (Mar. 2, 2014, 7:06
PM), https://twitter.com/theellenshow/status/440322224407314432?lang=en.
51. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the contributions
of both authors could not stand alone, and without either of their respective contributions, the work
would not exist).
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Should Ellen DeGeneres not get credit for arranging all the other
famous people 5 2 in the photo? 5 3 What about for posting the selfie on
Twitter 5 4 where it gained unprecedented popularity? 5 5 And how about
David Slater, the photographer that walked the jungles of North
Sulawesi for days trying to form the perfect picture of the mesmerizing
macaques? 56 Should he have to relinquish his rights to the photo of
Naruto just because Naruto was the one to press the button, even though
Slater was the person who created the conditions that allowed Naruto's
world-stopping selfie to be taken?" Conversely, it is obvious that
without the contribution of the button-presser-Naruto and Bradley
Cooper-the respective resulting photographs might not exist."
The default "pressing-of-the-shutter-button" rule is one of the ways
that an unintended author could receive copyright credit over the author
that intended to create such a photo in the first place.5 9 However, there
are also many instances in which an unintentional author contributes so
heavily to a work that-without their contributions-there would be no
masterpiece; in these cases, that unintended author is not given any
rights to the work due to the fact they did not have the necessary intent.
This Note therefore proposes a solution that will focus on the
intricate matter of joint ownership and how to better meet the needs of
both the intended author, who took the time and effort to create
something, and the unintended contributor, who fortuitously contributed
to the resulting work and achieved ownership due to a technicality in the
law. 6 1 Conversely, this solution also ensures that those unintended
52. Christopher Hooton, Ellen DeGeneres Takes Oscars 'Selfie' with Every A-Lister in
Existence and Breaks Twitter Record, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3, 2014, 4:25 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/ellen-degeneres-takes-oscars-selfie-with-every-alister-in-existence-9164456.html. Those captured in the photo are Jared Leto, Jennifer Lawrence,

Channing Tatum, Meryl Streep, Julia Roberts, Kevin Spacey, Bradley Cooper, Brad Pitt, Lupita
Nyong'O, Peter Nyong'O, and Angelina Jolie. Id.
53. Hannah Flint, Sorry Ellen! Bradley Cooper Owns the Rights to the Most Famous Selfie in
2014),
4,
(Mar.
MAIL
DAILY
Photo,
the
Took
He
History... Because

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbizarticle-2572822/Bradley-Cooper-owns-right-famnous-selfiehistory-took-photo.html.
54.

DeGeneres, supra note 50. The photo has been retweeted over 3.2 million times since its

initial posting. Id.
55.

Flint, supra note 53.

56. Wong, supra note 40.
57. Id.
58. Flint, supra note 53 ("Ellen Degeneres [sic] may have orchestrated the most famous selfie
in the world, but she doesn't actually own it. Bradley Cooper was the one to click the button on the
Samsung smartphone and capture the moment . . . ."); Wong, supra note 40.
59. See, e.g., Flint,supra note 53.
60. See infra Part III.B (describing cases in which there were multiple contributors to a work,
yet not all collaborators were given due credit for their contributions).
61. SeeinfraPartIV.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/8
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contributors get the rights they do deserve in cases where they would
normally have none. 62 Part II of this Note explains the history of the
current copyright law, including the reasons for its enactment, the scope
of its protection, and the workings of the current multi-author models.63
Part III then expands on joint ownership; specifically, it details the main
issues in regard to interpreting the law and understanding the amount of
intent and contribution necessary for one to actually be a co-author
under the statute.' Additionally, it explains the need for a change in the
law due to today's overly technological society.65 Ultimately,PartIV
supplies an amendment to the existing framework of the copyright law,
finally codifying certain precedents already set in the law regarding joint
ownership but allowing such precedents to apply to situations such as
that of David Slater and Ellen DeGeneres.66

II. GETTING DOWN TO MONKEY BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF THE
COPYRIGHT AcT OF 1976
Though copyright protection is not a novel concept, the United
States' current copyright law has only been in existence for less than
fifty years. 6 7 This Part focuses on the history of copyright law in the
United States and the way it has evolved over time68 Specifically,
Subpart A discusses the reasons the current copyright law came into
existence. 69 Subpart B expounds on the requirements of the Copyright
Law of 1976, as well as the protections it provides to the works that
meet such requirements.0 Finally, Subpart C discusses the specifics of
multi-authored works, and how the doctrine of joint copyright has
evolved since its utilization in American courts.7 1
A.

Needfor Change: Why the CopyrightAct of 1976 Came into
Existence

Copyright is a form of protection ingrained in United States law
since the country's creation of its Constitution.72 The Copyright Clause

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part IV.
H.R. REP.No. 94-1476, at 1 (1976) (detailing amendments made to the Copyright Act).
See infra Part Il.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part H.B.1-2.
See infra Part U.C.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]" Any subsequent copyright legislation was meant to
"foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public
welfare," as well as "give creators the reward due [to] them for their
contribution to society." 7 4 As was usual during the beginning years of
the United States, each state drafted and passed its own versions of
copyright laws based on England's Statute of Anne.7 However, the lack
of uniformity in state copyright laws guided the first Congress to pass
the Copyright Act of 1790.76 Authors, artists, and scientists were granted
the rights of printing, reprinting, and publishing their work for fourteen
years, including the option to renew for another fourteen years.7 7 This
monopoly was meant to provide an incentive to create original works,
but the limit on the monopoly helped stimulate creativity by allowing
wide access to works in the public domain.7 A major revision was
completed in 1909; this revision lengthened the protection period to
79
twenty-eight years with a possible renewal term of twenty-eight years.
Though Congress attempted to amend the law for the better, there was

73.

Id.

74. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 1:1 (1977)
[hereinafter GENERAL GUIDE].

75.

Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., ch. 21 (Eng.); see, e.g., 1786 N.Y.

Laws 298-300 (referencing "AN ACT to promote literature"); 1784 S.C. Acts 49-51 (referencing

"AN ACT For the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences"); 1785 Va. Acts 8-9 (referencing "An ACT
for securing to the AUTHORS of LITERARY WORKS an exclusive PROPERTY therein for a
limited Time").

76. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Comprehensive revisions were enacted
in 1831, 1870, and 1909. H.R.REP.NO.94-1476, at 47 (1976).
77. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS'N OF RES. LIBR.,
(last visited Nov. 18, 2019)
http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline
[hereinafter Copyright Timeline].
78. Id. It was recognized in Wheaton v. Peters that copyright law is a statutory creation, and
therefore, the author has no natural right to the protection of intellectual property. Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663-64 (1834). The Supreme Court further distinguished in subsequent cases
that "reward to the owner [is] a secondary consideration" to the benefit received by the public.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). More recently, Justice Stewart
summarized the Court's current view of the balance of copyright in Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts.
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return on the 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is . .. the general public good."

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
79. Copyright Timeline, supra note 77.
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much dissatisfaction with the 1909 revision,so and Congress sought a
more major adjustment of the law."
The Copyright Act of 197682 was the "most substantive change in
copyright law since the ratification of the Constitution."8 3 Register of
Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, described the statute as a "completely new
copyright statute, intended to deal with a whole range of problems
undreamed of by the drafters of the 1909 Act."8 4 Not only did this statute
completely restructure the American copyright system during that time
period, but it became the basis for the modem copyright law that exists
today.8 1 Using an advisory council of more than 100 industry
representatives, "the Copyright Office and the interested parties
hammered out the basic structure of the entire statute before including
Congress [in the legislative process].""
This large-scale change in copyright law occurred for multiple
reasons.87First, the influence of new technological developments could
no longer be ignored. 8 8 The 1909 Act was based on the printing press
being the primary circulator of information, but the Act was not fluid
enough to contend with the other technological advancements that were
fast-approaching at the time, such as the radio, television, computers,
photocopying machines, and video recorders. 89 Such developments
created new forms of creative expression that had never even existed
before, thereby requiring an extension of what copyright law protected.9

80. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 858 (1987) ("Courts 'stretched the limits of statutory language' in order to make the obsolete

1909 Act serviceable. By the time Congress replaced the 1909 Act, courts had embroidered the old
statute with a wealth of common law interpretation." (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BRIEFING
PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES, reprinted in Copyright Law Revision: Hearingson HR. 2223 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House JudiciaryComm.,

94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2053 (1975))).
8 1. Michael Jones, Note, Eldred v. Ashcroft: The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 89 (2004). Though a number of copyright law revision
measures were introduced between 1924 and 1940, they failed to be enacted. HR. REP. NO. 94-

1476, at 47.
82. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012).
83. Jones, supra note 81, at 90 (citing Christina N. Gifford, Note, The Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 363, 370 (2000)).
84. Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
477,479 (1977).
85. Gifford, supra note 83, at 370.
86. Litman, supra note 80, at 870-72. Professor Litman observes that though this may seem to
be an overly broad delegation of legislative authority, it can also be seen as an "ingenious solution"
to tackle a complicated matter. Id. at 879.

87.

See, e.g., H.R. REP.NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976).

88.
89.

Id.; Copyright Timeline, supra note 77.
GENERAL GUIDE, supra note 74, at 1:1.

90.

H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47.
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These developments would undoubtedly begin to impact what was
copyrighted, how those copyrighted materials could be copied in the
future, and furthermore, how copyrighted materials could be
infringed upon.9 1
Attempting to combine all interests and all concerns in a way that
satisfied artists and Congress members alike proved to be no easy feat:
The bill as a whole bespeaks concern for literally hundreds of
contending and overlapping special interests from every conceivable
segment of our pluralistic society. It was not enough to reach
compromise over one particular point; all compromises had to be kept
in equilibrium so that one agreement did not tip over another. 92
Parties with an economic interest in the property rights conferred
through copyright were ordered by Congress to "sit down with one
another and reach mutually agreeable solutions on substantive issues."93
Though it was a long process, with many players and conflicting ideas, a
revision was not only created, but it "somehow ... succeeded in
the end."94
Another major reason that Congress labored over creating new
copyright law was because the United States sought to update their laws
in order to be able to join the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention").9 The Berne
Convention wanted to achieve uniform international copyright

91.

Copyright Timeline, supra note 77; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 ("The technical

advances have generated new industries and new methods for reproduction and dissemination of
copyrighted works, and the business relations between authors and users have evolved new
patterns.").
92. GENERAL GUIDE, supra note 74, at 1:2 (quoting the Register of Copyrights, Barbara
Ringer); see also Litman, supra note 80, at 862 ("During more than twenty years of negotiations,
the substantive content of the statute emerged as a series of interrelated and dependent compromises

among industries with differing interests in copyright.").
93.

Jenny L. Dixon, Comment, The Copyright Term Extension Act: Is LAfe Plus Seventy Too

Much?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.945,959 (1996) (citing Litman, supra note 80, at 871).
94. GENERAL GUIDE, supra note 74, at 1:3 (quoting the Register of Copyrights, Barbara
Ringer).
95. Copyright Timeline, supra note 77; see also GENERAL GUIDE, supra note 74, at 2:4. The
original Berne Convention was signed on September 9, 1886, in Berne, Switzerland. Peter Burger,
The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (1988). The
original text of the Convention did not establish a minimum term of protection because of the
difficulty of coming to an agreement given the variations among contracting states at that time. Id.
at 17. The Berlin Revision of 1908, however, introduced a new term of protection into the
Convention: life plus fifty years after the author's death. Id. at 23. United States copyright law had

an identical copyright term when it initially passed the Copyright Act of 1976. GENERAL GUIDE,
supra note 74, at 2:3. However, after the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the copyright
term was extended from fifty years after the author's death toseventy years. Gifford, supra note 83,

at 364.
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protection through basic principles, which ultimately provide that
authors should receive the same protection that is available to them in
their home countries in all other member countries. 96 The United States'
change in its law brought the country into accord with international
copyright law, practices, and policies, making it possible for the United
States to become an even more dominant member in its international
trade pursuits.97
B. Scope of Protection Under the New Copyright Law
Unsurprisingly, with the revolutionary new law came a host of new
requirements necessary for protection under the law.9 However, these
protections did not surmount other competing interests; accordingly, this
Subpart not only explains the requirements needed to be guaranteed
protection of one's work, but also facilitates an understanding regarding
the concepts of appropriation, fair use, and infringement, and how these
concepts can affect an author's rights.99
1. Requirements for Protection of Copyrightable Material
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection resides "in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated[.]" 0 0 Simply put, "[t]he two
fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] originality and fixation
in a tangible medium."'o
For a statute that was as meticulously constructed as the Copyright
Act, having an undefined "originality" requirement seems surprisingly
ambiguous; however, the legislature purposely left "original works of
authorship" undefined because it preferred to retain the definition used
by the courts under the previous copyright statute. 0 2 Correspondingly, to
96.

Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works

(1886), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/summary-berne.html
#_ftnrefl (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
97. Gifford, supranote 83, at 371 ("[T]he United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988,
having come into compliance with the technical requirements of membership by passage of the
1976 Act.")
98. See infra Part I.B.1-2.
99. See infra Part 11I.B.1-2.
100. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
101. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
102. Id. "This sentiment [that the legislature wished to keep the standard view regarding the
definition of 'originality'] was echoed by the Copyright Office: 'Our intention here is to maintain
the established standards of originality . . . .' Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 355 (1991) (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF U.S.
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meet the "originality" standard, the work need only be independently
created by the author and possess at least some minimum degree of
creativity;1 0 3 no "novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit" is required.1 04
Coupled with this lenient standard for originality, the 1976 Act also
included an expansive definition of "works of authorship."' Again,
Congress purposely desired a broad meaning of the term, as history
demonstrated that copyright law is always gradually expanding, so a
broader term would encompass more for a greater amount of time. 0 6
Naturally, the fixation requirement is-as the rest of the statutebroad. 1 0 7The statute of the language dictates that "[a] work is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration." 0 This expands the scope of works protected-to motion
pictures and sound recordings, for example-as long as the content of
the live transmission is being recorded simultaneously with
its transmission. 09
Though the fixation requirement is not burdensome, it is
tremendously important in terms of protection: "[I]t is what separates
protectable from unprotectable original works of authorship.""o
Copyright law is not necessarily just interested in artistic thoughts and

COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Comm. Print 1965)).

103. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46 (reaffirming the precedent set in Trade-Mark Cases regarding
the originality requirement).
"[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original
designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original,and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings and the like."
Id. (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). "The originality requirement
articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases ... remains the touchstone of copyright protection today."
Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
104. H.R.REP.NO.94-1476,at5l.
105. Id.
106. Id. While the definition of "works of authorship" is expansive, section 102 of the
copyright law nonetheless outlines the subject matter of the material protected. Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). This subject matter includes "literary works; musical works,
including any accompanying words; dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works." Id.
107. HR. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
109. HR. REP. NO.94-1476, at 52-53.
110. See Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the FixationRequirement
in Copyright Law, 10 WASH. JL. TECH. & ARTS 17, 18 (2014) ("[Fixation] is the reason why novel
utterance is not protected but a novel sound recording is.").
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ideas; rather, copyright law is geared towards the encouragement of
artistic production, and a way to guarantee that ingenious ideas are
becoming precious pieces of work is through the fixation requirement.! I
Additionally, the concept of fixation not only helps determine whether
provisions of the Copyright Act apply, but also represents the line
between common law and statutory protection112
Taking the legislative history of the 1976 Act into consideration,
the statute was therefore intended to be interpreted as immediately
extending copyright protection' 3 toan author as long as the author's
work possessed the low level of requisite creativityl 4 and was fixed in a
tangible medium.11
2. The Limits of Copyright Protection
Copyright law generally protects an original work of authorship
from infringement.16 nfringement "occurs when a copyrighted works is
reproduced, distributed, performed, publicly displayed, or made into a
derivative work without the permission of the copyright owner."' 17
However, due to the Fair Use Doctrine-which was finally codified in
the 1976 Act" 8-there is a limit on what is due exclusive protection
under the Act." 9
Though authors are afforded the rights of protection from
infringement, it does not undermine other author's abilities to make "fair
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52. Though an unfixed work of authorship-such as an
improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic work, performance or broadcast-could be subject to
protection under state common law or statute, it would not be eligible for federal statutory
protection under section 102. Id.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Section 106 details the exclusive rights in copyrighted works. Id.
Generally, there are five fundamental rights: reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance,
and display. Id.
114. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991).
115. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51-52; see also Edward Valachovic, Comment, The
ContributionRequirement to a Joint Work Under the Copyright Act, 12 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REV.
199, 200 (1992) ("The author is the person who actually creates the work, the person who translates
an idea into a fixed expression entitled to copyright protection."). The only exception to the
authorship rule is the "work made for hire" doctrine, where the author is the employer of the creator
of the work, unless otherwise agreed upon. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). Though there are other
considerations that may limit the amount of protection received originality and fixation prove to be
.main considerations when considering the copyrightable nature of a work. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104
(referencing some other considerations).
116. Copyright
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
TEACHING
COPYRIGHT,
https://www.teachingcopyright.org/handout/copyright-faq.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
117. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Definitions, COPYRIGHT.Gov, https://www.copyright.gov/help/
faq/faq-definitions.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
119. Id.;H.R.REP.NO.94-1476,at65.
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use" of the earlier writer's work.1 20 "Fair use" is not easily defined, but
the 1961 Register's Report described "fair use" as "a reasonable portion
of a copyrighted work [that is] reproduced without permission when
necessary for a legitimate purpose which is not competitive with the
21
copyright owners' marker for his work."
Unsurprisingly, "[the judicial doctrine of fair use [is] one of the
most important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right of
copyright owners .. . . ."122 Though the criteria of those judicial rules
could be stated a number of different ways, the standards to be analyzed
were formulated into section 107 in the following way:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of commercial nature of is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.1 23
Just as everything else with the Copyright Act, fair use was another
compromise that had to be made1 2 4 : "The wording of the fair use
provision . . emerged from a hard-fought compromise involving
protracted, down-to-the-wire negotiations among representatives of
and
publishers,
music
publishers,
composers,
authors,
educationalinstitutions."2

C. How Copyright Ownership Exists in Multi-Authored Works
Since the Copyright Act of 1976 was intended to be created
broadly,126 it leaves itself vulnerable to different statutory interpretations,
1 28
and thereby, lawsuits.1 27 However, of the "hotly litigated issues" that
120.

Harper& Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).

121. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT

LAW 24 (Comm. Print 1961).
122. HR.REP.NO.94-1476,at65.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
124. Litman, supra note 80, at 876. One of the main disagreements was regarding the scope of
the fair use under the then-existing law. Id.
125. Id. at 869.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
127. See, e.g., Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 426 n.9 (9th Cir. 2018) (demonstrating that
PETA relied on the fact that the 1976 Act did not specifically denote that animals could not hold
copyright, thereby allowing for suit against Slater on behalf of the monkey).
128. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 110, at 17 (discussing the issues there are with the fixation
requirement due to authors and lawyers "pushing the conceptual boundaries of communicative
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have entered the courtroom since the enactment of the 1976 Act,
ownership has become an increasingly complex area of the law.1 29 When
one person is both the sole creator and sole funder of his or her work,
then the initial issue of copyright ownership is no issue at all: That
creator would own his or her work. 3s However, as soon as another
person-or, for example, a button-pushing monkey-is involved, the
issue of ownership becomes more involved as well.' This Subpart
delves into the doctrine of joint works that existed prior to Copyright Act
of 1976 in order to jump into the shoes of the legislature of that time and
understand its reasoning for codifying "joint works."32 This Subpart
then discusses how joint works were treated after the codification.1 33
1. Joint Works Prior to 1976
The 1976 Act contains the first statutory definition of joint work. 13 4
However, prior to this codification, the doctrine of joint authorship owed
its origins to Judge Learned Hand. 1 3 5 In Maurel v. Smith,'13 6 Judge Hand,
using English law,' 3 7 held that joint authorship would arise "when parties
contribute labor to work under a common and preconcerted

media").
129. Michael Landau, Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation
Through Statutory Misinterpretation,54 IDEA 157, 158 (2014).
130. Id.
131. Id.; see, e.g., Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation:The Current State
of Joint Work Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REv. 43, 43 (1997) (detailing another example of how
determining copyright ownership is not necessarily straightforward under the doctrine of joint
works).
132. See infra Part H.C..
133. See infra Part I.C.2.
134. Landau, supra note 129, at 166. "Joint work" was a judicially created doctrine. Id. The
1909 Act was silent on the definition of joint ownership, so common law was the basis of the
definition of joint works for the 1976 Act. Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive
Collaborator:Preserving the Right of JointAuthors,50 EMORY LJ. 193, 194-95 (2001).
135. Lape, supra note 131, at 45; see also Landau, supra note 129, at 160 (noting that New
York federal courts were largely responsible for the formulation of the joint authorship doctrine).
136. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). This case involved a
plaintiff claiming that he and the defendant were joint authors of an opera. Id. at 197. The plaintiff
wrote a story for an opera and made a subsequent agreement with the defendant to write the libretto;
however, the defendant, without informing the plaintiff, finished the libretto and contracted with
another party to publish and copyright the entire opera. Id. at 196-97.
137. Judge Hand admitted that he could find "strangely little law regarding the rights of joint
authors of books or dramatic compositions." Id. at 199. Instead, he heavily relied on the notions
stated in Levy v. Rutley. Id. ("If two persons undertake jointly to write a play, agreeing on the
general outline and design and sharing the labor of working it out, each would be contributing to the
whole production, and they might be said to be joint authors of it; but to constitute joint authorship,
there must be common design." (quoting Levy v. Rutley (1871) 6 Eng. Rep. 521 [530] (Ct. Con.
Pl.))).
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design." 3 8"Common design"-the intent to contribute to one workbecame the basis for finding joint authorship.1 3 9
Judge Hand further developed the doctrine in 1944 with the Second
40
Circuit case Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.'
Similar to the prerequisite of current joint ownership law, Judge Hand
clarified that intent is the hallmark of joint authorship: "It makes no
difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether they
know each other; it is enough that they mean their contributions
complementary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single
work to be performed as such."1 4 1 Accordingly, under Marks, it was not
necessary for authors of a joint work to have worked together-or to
have even known each other-for the work to be legally categorized as a
"joint work."' 42
The holding in Marks was stretched too far in 1955 in Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 143 also known as the 12th
Street Rag case.'"Here, the Second Circuit held "[a] combined work
could be considered a 'joint work' even if one of the creators of a
component part did not have any intent to merge his or her part into a
larger unitary whole."145 Furthermore, "it allowed the assignee of the
composition to have the necessary intent, as opposed to the author
himself or herself ... eliminat[ing] any requirement of collaboration on
the part of the parties involved."46
138. Landau, supra note 129, at 161 (paraphrasing the rule stated in Maurel v. Smith).
139. Lape, supra note 131, at 46; see, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944) (defining a joint work as "'ajoint laboring in furtherance of a
common design' (quoting Levy, 6 Eng. Rep. at 527) and stating that the parties must "mean their
contributions . .. to be embodied in a single work"); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d. Cir.
1921) (stating that "the pith of joint authorship consists in co-operation, in a common design")
(internal citations omitted)).
140. Marks, 140 F.2d at 266. This dispute centers around Edward B. Marks, lyricist who wrote
a song and brought it to a publisher of songs, Harding, who bought it. Id. Harding, without
informing Mark, engaged Loraine to compose music for the words, and thereafter published the
song. Id. Since Marks gave the words to Harding with the intent that they be put to music, it was
held that, from the start, each contributor intended the work to be performed as a whole, and
therefore, should have rights as joint authors. Id. at 267.
141. Id. at 267.
142. Id.
143. 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955). In this case, Euday L. Bowman had composed a piece that
was intended to be an instrumental piano solo. Id. at 570. He then assigned his rights in the piece to
J.W. Jenkins Music Company, and this assignee employed James S. Sumner to write lyrics for
Bowman's music. Id. The Second Circuit held that the final product was also a "joint work." Id.
144. Lape, supra note 131, at47-48.
145. Landau, supra note 129, at 164.
146. Id. at 162. Said another way, the Second Circuit held that "the intent to contribute to a
larger work can be conceived long after the first contribution had been produced, and can be
conceived by someone other than the author of the contribution." Lape, supra note 131, at 45-46 n.7
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It was after the widely-criticized decision in 12th Street Rag that
major legislative efforts were undertaken to reshape copyright law and
finally add a statutory definition of "joint work." 47 The resulting 1976
Act was not intended to depart from prior case law,148 but rather, was
intended to discount the 12th Street Rag rule and those cases that felt
bound to its precedent.4 9
2. Joint Works After 1976
Under the 1976 Act, "joint work" is defined as "a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.""'o
Therefore, in order for a work to gamer the classification of "joint
work," there must be a "desire to make the contributions part of a single
end product ... evidenced at the time of creation.""' With that intent,
the authors of the resulting product would become proportional' 5 2 Coowners of copyright in the work,' 5 3 treated as tenants in common, "with
each co[-]owner having an independent right to use or license the use of
a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co[-]owners for any
profits."154However, though the 1976 Act added "joint work" to its list

(citing Shapiro, 221 F.2d at 570) ("[Tihe test [should be] the consent of whoever holds the
copyright on the first author's product at the time of the collaboration.").

147.
148.
the 1976
149.

Lape,supra note 131, at44.
Id. at 45. It is important to highlight that the holding in Marks would be consistent with
Act, but the holding in the 12th Street Rag case would not. Id. at 48.
See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that

application of the 12th Street Rag doctrine would be necessary for a finding that the television
program at issue was a joint work); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (subverting use of the 12th Street Rag doctrine by holding that the song in question
was not considered a joint work because there was no substantial contribution to the song after it
was composed by the original author).

150.

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.

§

101 (2012).

151. Landau, supra note 129, at 166-67. "Joint ownership should not be confused with
ownership of a derivative work, which occurs when copyrightable expression is incorporated into
another person's solely authored, and thus exclusively owned, work assuming he or she lawfully
used the pre-existing material." John M. Neclerio & Urmika Devi, Joint Ownership of Patents,
Copyrights and Trade Secrets in the United States, DUANE MORRIS LLP 1, 7 (2011),
https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/joint-ip memoneclerio.pdf; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103
(2012) (noting that section 102 of the Copyright Act extends protection for derivative works only
when used lawfully, and such protection does not "affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership,
or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.").
152. Landau, supra note 129, at 168.

153.
154.

17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976). "An exception is that a joint author may not assign

the work or grant an exclusive license to the work without permission of the other authors." Landau,
supra note 129, at 168.
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of definitions, issues in regard to what constituted "joint work" and
"joint authors" nevertheless persisted.
III.

THROWING A MONKEY WRENCH INTO THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE "JOINT WORK" DOCTRINE

Of the consequences that may arise from joint authorship, joint
56
ownership could be one of the most severe.1 Due to the fact that those
7
considered joint owners of a work are given such extensive rights,' it is
important to understand how to interpret "joint ownership" so as give
those extensive rights to the correct parties."'
Under joint ownership, "[a]bsent an agreement to the contrary, each
author of a joint work has an equal claim to those profits and an equal
right to exploit the work, even if the author's contributions were not
equal."1 59 According to the statute's language, its sole requirement is that
there be an intent to combine the work. 160 Nonetheless, the 1976 Act is
silent as to what amount of contribution is necessary from each author
61
for the resulting work to be considered a "joint work."' Currently, the
framework that has been used to understand whether a piece of
authorship is a "joint work" requires two major enquires that encompass
both issues of "intent" and "amount of contribution": "first, what type
and amount of creative contribution is necessary to establish that a
particular contributor is an 'author'?, and second, what type of
subjective intent is necessary to establish a person's coauthorial status?"1 62
As a result, many diverse judicial efforts have been taken to better
6
understand what joint ownership means in practice.' Subparts A and B
focus on the tests currently in use after the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1976, from those tests submitted by commenters' to those
155. See infra Part III.
156. LaFrance,supra note 134, at 193.
157. See id. ("[Tlhe authors enjoy equal and undivided ownership of the copyright, allowing
each to exploit the work freely, subject to a duty to account to the others for a ratable share of the
exploitation profits."); see also Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[Aln
action for infringement between joint owners will not lie because an individual may not infringe on
his own copyright.").
158. See infra Part Il.C (explaining the reasons it is important for the correct parties to receive
ownership rights).
159. LaFrance, supranote 134, at 193.
160. Landau, supra note 129, at 166; see also Neclerio & Devi, supra note 140, at 7 ("[J]oint
works are distinguished based on the intent of the participants.").
161. Landau, supra note 129, at 167.
162. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 194.
163. Landau, supra note 129, at 172.
164. See infra Part III.A.
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actually utilized by the courts. 1 65 Not only are the downfalls of these
tests considered within this analysis, but additionally, the consequences
of not having a more accurate test are discussed in Subpart C to
demonstrate the pertinence of developing a better framework for joint
ownership analysis.166
A.

ProfessorNimmer vs. ProfessorGoldstein:DisagreementAmong
Commentators

There have been differing approaches as to what amount of
contribution rises to joint authorship, but there are two main competing
tests for assessing supposed co-authors.1 6 7 The first approach-the "de
minimis" test espoused by Professor William Nimmer-is usually
contrasted with Professor Paul Goldstein's "copyrightability subject
matter test."l68
Professor Nimmer's de minimis test requires that a joint author's
contribution be more than a de minimis rather than independently
copyrightable expression. 16 9 De minimis is a shortened version of de
mini mis non curat lex, which translates as "[t]he law doth not regard
trifles."170Though there is debate as to what the exact translation is, "the
basic meaning of the maxim is clear: the law will not resolve petty or
unimportant disputes."171
Accordingly, under the de minimis test, Professor Nimmer believes
that each author's contribution should be more than de minimis, more
than just a few simple words or phrases.1 72 The contribution need not be
independently copyrightable;1 7 3 accordingly, "a party that contributes
only abstract ideas or information, but not copyrightable expression,
may be a joint author." 174 Professor Nimmer believes that only
165.

See infra PartI.B.

166.

See infra Part III.C.

167.

Neclerio & Devi, supra note 140, at 7.

168. Id. at 7-8.
169. Id. at 7.
170.

Max L. Veech & Charles R. Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV. 537,

537-38 (1947); see also Porter v. Rushing, 65 F. Supp. 759, 760 (W.D. Ark. 1946) (defining the
maxim as "the law cares not for small things").
171. Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposalfor Its Application in Copyright,
21 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 945, 948 (2006). The maxim could also be used as an adjective to describe
things that are trifling, unimportant, or insufficient. Id. at 950.
172. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07 (2018)
("[A] person must add more than a word or a line to qualify as a joint author.").
173. Id.
174. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 196; see, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 172, § 6.07
("[I]f authors A and B work in collaboration, with A contributing sparkling plot ideas and B weaving
them into a completed screenplay, it cannot be doubted that both have made more than a de minimis
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contributing "intellectual modification" can make someone a joint
author; thus, physical labor nor financial contribution can turn a person
into a joint owner of the copyright.'7 5 This more expansive view of joint
ownership has been criticized as being impractical and difficult to apply
by courts that favor a restrictive view of joint ownership.
According to those courts, there are several weaknesses inherent
within Professor Nimmer's test. 17 7 The main area of contention is the
fact that Professor Nimmer's test supposedly is not consistent with one
of the Copyright Act's premises"7: "In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work."' 7 9 Courts read Professor Nimmer's test as

stifling creativity because if there is "the threat that accepting
suggestions from another party might jeopardize the author's sole
entitlement to a copyright," authors may not collaborate at all."'s
Additionally, Professor Nimmer was said to provide little guidance
on how much contribution would rise to the level of "joint authorship,"
except to state that the contribution must be "more than a word or a
line."

18

' What little guidance Professor Nimmer does give would be

insufficient when trying to resolve cases.1 8 2 For complex cases in which
the brainstorming process resulted in valuable contributions to a work,
Professor Nimmer's test does not set out a direction for courts to
3
18
advance in to ascertain where exactly joint authorship began.
Goldstein's
Professor
favor
courts
most
Conversely,
"copyrightability subject matter test."' 84 This test requires each author to
make a contribution that would be independently copyrightable.' "This
test draws support from the notion that authorship always requires
86
creation of original expression as distinct from mere ideas."' Distinct
from Professor Nimmer's test, a collaborator who only contributes facts
or ideas cannot be a co-author of the work because ideas are not
contribution to the resulting script.").
175.
176.

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 172, § 6.07.
LaFrance, supra note 134, at 196.

Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070.
181. NIMMER & NLMMER, supra note 172, § 6.07.
182. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070.
183. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.

184.
185.

LaFrance, supra note 134, at 197.
PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, & PRACTICE

186.

Neclerio & Devi, supra note 140, at 8.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/8
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copyrightable.' Professor Goldstein-and courts adopting this viewjustify this position by using sections 102 and 302(b).1 8
This standard creates a narrower concept of joint copyright, and the
courts' preference for this standard demonstrates the belief that a
copyrighted work should have a very limited number of authors.1 89
However, critics do not believe it is fair that one sole author who draws
its inspiration from many sources should receive a monopoly on the
rights of the work: Why is his or her contribution more valuable or more
essential to the work of authorship than any other contribution from any
other author?'"
B. Illustrative Cases: DisagreementAmong the Courts
The majority of courts agree with the standards set out in Childress
v. Taylor,1 9 1which is largely based on Professor Goldstein's approach to
187. Id.; see also WLLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §5:14 (2012) ("In order to be a
'joint' author, one must be an 'author.' To be an author, one must independently create and
contribute at least some minimal amount of expression.... From a policy perspective, the
requirement ensures that the scope of the joint authorship doctrine is not expanded to include
editors, research assistants, actors in plays, and movie consultants.").

188.

Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070-71. Professor Goldstein notes that "§ 101's and § 302(b)'s use

of the word 'authors' suggests that each collaborator's contribution must be a copyrightable 'work

of authorship' within the meaning of § 102(a)." Id.
189. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 197-98.
190. Id. at 198.
191. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). There were two important precursors to the Childress
decision, the first being Weissmann v. Freeman, and the other being Fisher v. Klein. LaFrance,

supra note 134, at 213, 216.
Weissmann not only rejected the joint intent standard of the 12th Street Rag doctrinewhich stated that there could be a joint work even if there was no intent to merge contributions-but
also added a distinct new element of intent. Id. at 213. Weissmann featured a conflict between
professor and assistant, in which-after a long relationship of researching and co-authoring
scholarly works together-the assistant individually wrote what she considered her own work, and
the professor, believing himself to be a co-author, used the assistant's work and styled it as his own.

Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1315-16 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit held that each
author must contribute to the work and that each author must intend to create a joint work at the
time his or her contribution is made; this was not present in the facts as presented. Id. at 1318. The
holding of Weissman increased the confusion surrounding the "intent" requirement: The Second
Circuit interpreted "intent" to require that both authors share not only a contemporaneous intent to
merge their creative efforts but also a contemporaneous intent to create a joint authorship
relationship to one another. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 214.
The other precursor to Childress was Fisher, which was not striking due to its holding but
rather due to its dicta. Id. The Fisher case dealt with a joint authorship dispute between two jewelry

designers. Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1795,1795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The presiding judge,
Judge Leval, articulated two novel concepts: first, that within joint works, there is a "dominant
author," which he does not explicitly define; secondly, that a joint work will not arise from a
collaboration unless that dominant author intends their authorship with another person. Fisher, 16

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. Childress relied heavily on Weissman and Fisher,leading to a test that
seems to have led courts to endorse "misattribution as a device by which one author can obtain sole
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copyright.1 92 However, that is not the only illustrative case on the
subject, as each jurisdiction has made their own decisions in interpreting
"joint ownership" and "joint authorship."1 93 Childress v. Taylor addresses
a joint ownership issue stemming from the co-creation of a play.1 94
Defendant Clarice Taylor, an actress, became interested in developing a
play based on the legendary Black comedian Jackie "Moms" Mabley's
life, after portraying Mabley in an off-off Broadway production.1 95 After
Taylor began doing the preliminary research and gathering the necessary
materials, she contacted plaintiff, playwright Alice Childress, about
actually writing the play.1 9 6 Childress agreed, and together they created a
play about Mabley, with Taylor providing the research, and Childress
creating the actual structure and dialogue of the play.197
Childress received the copyright for the play in her name, and
Taylor produced the play.1 98 However, as with many relationships
without formal agreements, after the second production of the play, the
relationship between Taylor and Childress deteriorated, with any
proposed agreements falling through. 9 9 Taylor decided to mount another
production of the play without Childress and hired another writer, Ben
Caldwell, to write yet another play featuring Mabley.200 Using
Childress's script, she informed Caldwell of the elements she wanted
changed, and he complied. 2 0 1 When the play was produced again with
the revised script, there was no mention of Childress's name anywhere,
though there was reference to the original production of the play in a
casting notice published in a trade paper. 20 2 This set off a chain reaction
in which Childress sued Taylor for violations of the Copyright Act;
Taylor defended herself, contending she was a joint author with

copyright in a collaborative work," hanning the other contributors in the process. LaFrance, supra
note 134, at 220.
192. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 220-21.
193. Landau, supra note 129, at 172.
194. Childress, 945 F.2d at 501-02.
195. Id. at 502.
196. Id. Taylor knew Childress since the 1940s, as they were both associated with the
American Negro Theatre in Harlem and Taylor had acted in a number of Childress's plays. Id.
197. Id. Not only did Taylor conduct the research, but she additionally conversed with
Childress daily, discussing with her the inclusion of certain scenes and characters within the play.
Id. She also interviewed family members,made character decisions, and suggested scenes. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 503.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. There were other references, such an advertisement for Taylor's production of
Caldwell's play which mentioned reviewed garnered after the production of Childress's play. Id. at
504.
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Childress and therefore shared the rights to the play.203 In assessing
Taylor's claim to joint ownership, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
came up with two requirements for a work of authorship to be
considered a "joint work": "(1) that each of the parties contribute an
independently copyrightable contribution and (2) that the parties
intended to be joint authors when they were working on their
respectivecontributions."204
The independent copyrightable contribution is not stated anywhere
in the Copyright Act. 2 0 5 However, the court was persuaded by the
Register of Copyright's stance, which supports the view that there must
be an independent copyrightable contribution by putative co-authors. 2 0 6
Taking this stance does not only help prevent some "spurious claims by
those who might otherwise try to share the fruits of the efforts of a sole
author of a copyrightable work," 2 0 7 but also "strikes an appropriate
balance in the domains of both copyright and contract law."2 0
Though the independent copyrightable contribution presents the
first obstacle a putative joint author must pass in order to gain joint
ownership of the work, the other obstacle is the cornerstone of joint
ownership: intent. 20 9 "[T]he court acknowledges that there is no intent
provision in the statute itself," but "attempted to fill in the statutory
language by interpreting 'intent' to mean, not intent to merge the
contributions, but intent to jointly own."2o The court primarily takes this
stance because an expansive definition of intent would extend that joint
authorial status to "many persons who are not likely to have been within

203. Id.
204. Landau, supra note 129, at 175-76. This rule is called the "relationship test" by some
authors. See LaFrance,supra note 134, at 220 ("[The Second Circuit converted the relationshiptest
into a new rule of law after subjecting it to only a minimal level of scrutiny.") (emphasis added).
205. Childress,945 F.2d at 506.
206. Id. at 507. The independent copyrightable contribution-also known as the
"copyrightability" test-is the test articulated by Professor Goldstein. See supra Part M.A.
207. Childress,945 F.2d at 507.
208. See id.
In the absence of [a] contract, the copyright remains with the one or more persons who
created copyrightable material.... It seems more consistent with the spirit of copyright
law to oblige all joint authors to make copyrightable contributions, leaving those with
non-copyrightable contributions to protect their rights through contract.
Id.
209. Id.
210. Landau, supra note 129, at 181; see Childress, 945 F.2d at 507 ("The wording of the
[statute] appears to make relevant only the state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished
work-an intention 'that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole."'); see also id. at 508 (stating that, in order to determine whether there is jointauthorship, it must be determined whether, in the absence of contractual agreements concerning
listed authorship, each participant intended that they would be identified as co-authors).
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the contemplation of Congress."211 Therefore, even if one of the putative
co-authors believed the work was a joint work, all of the co-authors
must believe the work to be a joint work.2 1 2
Though the rule formulated in Childress seems like an easily
ascertainable standard, there are some obvious issues with its
application. 2 1 3 Specifically, these issues stem from the "intent to be joint
authors" requirement. 2 1 4 When deciding to embark on a creative venture,
the parties involved usually do not notify their legal counsel to define the
rights and obligations of each party; co-writers just write, co-artists just
draw, each respective putative author hoping to capture his or her vision
in the joint work.2 1 5 Since there is usually no tangible evidence that each
author intended to jointly own the work, any disagreement down the
road may lead one author to claiming to solely own the work, thereby
destroying any possibility of meeting the intent requirement.2 1 6
An additional problem with the Childress test is that, while there
are two prongs to the test, the Second Circuit stopped the analysis after
concluding that the "intent to be joint authors" prong was not met.2 17
However, does such an incomplete analysis truly give justice to

211. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507. The court goes on to distinguish which types of relationships
would not be in Congress' purview when initially drafting the Copyright Act. Id. These
relationships include the writer-editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship, asaccording to the court-these relationships lack the intent of both participants in the venture to
regard themselves as joint authors. Id.
The court's handling of these types of relationships has been criticized, as many writereditor or writer-researcher relationships can be filed under the "work made for hire" doctrine, in
which the editors or researchers work for a larger firm, contracting to do the work with the
knowledge they would not be given the credit for it. Landau, supra note 129, at 182. Additionally,
there have been cases in which researchers not under the "work made for hire doctrine" have been
given the title of joint author. See Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a professor's graduate student was held to be a "joint author" of a journal article with the
university professor, as the graduate student made "significant" contributions to the article, as
determined by the court).
212. Childress, 945 F.2d at 509 ("[Whatever thought of co-authorship might have existed in
Taylor's mind 'was emphatically no shared by the purported co-author.' There is no evidence that
Childress ever contemplated, much less would have accepted, crediting the play 'as written by Alice
Childress and Clarice Taylor."'). In Childress, it was ruled that even if Taylor's contributions were
independently copyrightable, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that
Childress had the state of mind required for joint authorship. Id.
213. Landau, supra note 129, at 181.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 179-82.
216. Id. at 182.
217. Childress, 945 F.2d at 509 ("We need not determine whether we agree with [Judge
Haight's] conclusion that Taylor's contributions were not independently copyrightable since, even if
they were ... we agree that there is no evidence from which a trier could infer Childress had the
state of mind required for joint authorship.").
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Taylor? 218
What
if her
contributions
were
independently
copyrightable? 219 Should she not be protected in some way, given rights
to the characters she helped to craft or the scenes she helped to create? 220
The Childress test leaves these questions open, not only possibly
curtailing the rights deserved by one author, but also, most likely
lengthening the litigation period in such a way that is unduly
burdensome to all parties involved. 2 2 1
Childress was followed by the Seventh Circuit case, Erickson v.
Trinity Theatre.2 22 This case involved Karen Erickson, one of the
founders of Trinity Theatre, who served the theatre in various
capacities; 2 2 3this case specifically revolved around her capacity as a
playwright. 22 4 When compiling and writing plays,225 actors frequently
made suggestions that were incorporated into the play.226 WhenTrinity
began producing the plays, Trinity credited Erickson as playwright and
began paying her royalties for the performances.227 However, these
royalty payments stopped; accordingly, Erickson registered the works in
her name and sued Trinity for copyright infringement. 228 Trinity
defended itself, claiming that it was a "joint author" with Erickson due
to all of the contributions to the plays made by the employees-such as
the actors-ofthe theatre.229
The court held that in order for a work to garner "joint authorship"
status, the two-pronged test articulated in Childress v. Taylor must be
met.2 30 The Seventh Circuit continued on to explain that "[i]deas,
refinements, and suggestions, standing alone, are not the subjects of
copyright." 2 31 However, what if those "refinements" and "suggestions"
218. Landau, supra note 129, at 183.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
223. Id. at 1063. Erickson served as playwright, artistic director, actress, play director, business
manager, and member of the board of directors. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. The plays at issue here were Much Ado About Shakespeare, The Theatre Time
Machine, and PrairieVoices: Talesform Illinois. Id.
226. Id. at 1063-64. For example, one of the actors, Michael Osborne, testified that as Erickson
was compiling Much Ado About Shakespeare, revisions on the script were made during rehearsals;
he specifically suggested some ideas that lead to the creation of certain passages. Id.
227. Id. Erickson had a two-year license agreement with Trinity that listed her as "playwright"
and agreed to pay her royalties for the term of that agreement. Id.
228. Id. at 1064-65.
229. Id. at 1065.
230. See id. at 1071 ("We agree with the Childress court's observation that the copyrightability
test 'strikes an appropriate balance in the domains of both copyright and contract law."').
231. Id. at 1072. As a result of such a holding, though some actors were able to point out
specific contributions they had made to Erickson's work, these contributions were not
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led to a substantial change in the work? 23 2 Where is the justice for those

in the Trinity Theatre, for example, who convened over a significant
time period with Erickson to create a play that became successful? 233Are
exceptional "suggestions" and "refinements" not the foundation of a
transcendent piece of work? 23 4
Another Second Circuit case that slightly altered the joint
authorship definition yet again is the high-profile case of Thomson v.
Larson.23 5The musical Rent began as a joint project of Billy Aronson
and composer Jonathan Larson. 2 3 6 However, after an amicable
separation, Aronson agreed he would not be considered an active
collaborator of the musical. 2 3 7 Larson's Rent script was received well by
the Artistic Director of the New York Theatre Workshop ("NYTW"),
238
Still working
which encouraged the development of Larson's script.
Thomson as
of
Lynn
hiring
with the project, Larson agreed to NYTW's
2 39 to assist him in clarifying the storyline of the musical?"
a dramaturg
Though there was an agreement between the two, 24 1 the agreement was
silent as to copyright interests or any issue of ownership with respect to
the final work. 24 2

Though Thomson and Larson worked extensively on the script
together, Larson was given a majority, if not all the credit.2 4 3 That is until
Larson died suddenly and various members of NYTW and Thomson had
to work together to fine-tune the script. 2 44 It was at this point that
Thomson sought more compensation and credit for her work. 245 When
this did not happen, she sued, claiming that she was a co-author and
24 6
therefore deserved the related rights to the script.
independently copyrightable, therefore not meeting the Childress prongs. Id.
232. Landau, supra note 129, at 186.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
236. Id. at 197.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. Dramaturgs provide a range of services to playwrights and directors in connection with
the production and development of theater pieces, including help with plot elements, dramatic
structure, character details, themes, and even specific language. Id. at 197 n.5.
240. Id. at 197.
241. Id. The agreement stated that NYTW would pay a fee of two thousand dollars in full
consideration of the services rendered, as well as provide for billing credit for Thomson as
"dramaturg." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 197-98.
244. Id. at 198.
245. Id. Thomson had approached Larson's heirs to discuss settlement agreements regarding
how much of the royalties that Thomson should get, yet those agreements went nowhere. Id.
246. Id.
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Again, the Childress factors were adhered to in this case.247 The
court viewed the intent requirement in Childress as requiring that "the
parties 'entertain in their minds the concept of joint ownership."' 24 8 It
would not be enough that the parties intended to merge their
contributions into one unitary work, but rather, they must have intended
to be joint authors. 2 4 9 Additionally, the court in this case proceeded to
examine "factual indicia," such as how a collaborator regards himself or
herself in relation to the work in terms of billing and credit, decisionmaking, and the right to enter contracts.250
This adds another layer to the Childress test, but does it solve the
problems illuminated by the previous cases, or does it just continue to
confuse the doctrine? 251 The Ninth Circuit adds a twist to the joint works
doctrine, actually moving away from Childress in Aalmuhammed v.
Lee.252 In another high-profile case, Jefri Aalmuhammed claimed to be a
co-author of the movie Malcom X, 25 3 directed by Spike Lee 25 4 and
starring Denzel Washington. 25 5
There was no contract between Aalmuhammed and Warner
Brothers, Lee, or Lee's production companies.256 Though he was
compensated by both Lee and Washington, Aaluhammed aspired to
receive co-authorial status on the work; not only was he denied, but
when the film was released, Aalmuhammed was given inconsequential
credit. 2 57 Consequently, Aalmuhammed applied for a copyright with the

247. Id. at 200-05 (analyzing the facts of the case according to the Childress test).
248. Id. at 201 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991)).
249. Id. (citing Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154,1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
250. Id. at 201 (citing Childress, 945 F.2d at 508); see id. at 202-05 (describing how the
"factual indicia" were analyzed in Thomson itself).
251. LaFrance, supra note 134, at 239; see also Thompson, 147 F.3d at 206 (discussing the
inability of the court to classify Thompson's contributions under the current doctrine: "Our circuit
has not decided whether a person who makes a non-de minimis copyrightable contribution but
cannot meet the mutual intent requirement of co-authorship, retains, in the absence of a work-forhire agreement or of any explicit contractual assignment of the copyright, any rights and interests in
his or her own contribution.").
252. 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000); LaFrance, supra note 134, at 246.
253. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1229. Aalmuhammed's evidence that he was extensively
involved in the movie-making process included the following: reviewing the shooting script for
Spike Lee and suggesting extensive revisions; directing Washington and the other actors while on
set; creating two entire scenes with new characters; editing parts of the movie during postproduction; and meeting with numerous Islamic organizations to persuade them that the movie was
an accurate depiction of Malcom X's life. Id. at 1230.
254. Id. at 1229. Lee co-wrote the screenplay, directed, and co-produced the movie. Id.
255. Id. Washington had actually asked Aalmuhammed to assist him in his preparation for the
starring role, as Aalmuhammed not only knew a lot about Malcom X, but he had also written,
directed, and produced a documentary film about Malcom X. Id.
256. Id. at 1230.
257. Id. He was credited as "Islamic Technical Consultant" way down the list of credits. Id.
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USCO, claiming to be co-creator, co-writer, and co-director, and then
sued Lee and his production companies, among others, for declaratory
relief and accounting under the Copyright Act. 2 58
The court primarily utilized the "author theory" discussed in
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony2 59 to distinguish who is an
"author." 260 Burrow-Giles contemplated the question of who is the
author of a photograph: the person who sets it up and snaps the shutter,
or the person who makes the lithograph. 26 1 The court ultimately decided
that an author is the person who originates, makes, produces, and is the
inventive mastermind of the thing to be protected; in other words, an
author is "the man who really represents, creates or gives effect to the
idea, fancy, or imagination." 2 62 Utilizing this definition as a foundation
for its analysis, the court in Aalmuhammed further stated the author of a
work to be the person to whom the work owes its origin and who
superintended the whole work-thereby insinuating that directors,
producers, starring actors, or screenwriters would gain this "master
mind" title.26 3
Combining the author theory with the "thoughtful opinion" in
Thomson, the court enumerated three factors as criteria for joint
authorship in the absence of a contract.2 64 First is the idea that the author
"superintends the work by exercising control." 26 5 Secondly, "putative
coauthors make objective manifestations of a shared intent to be
coauthors ... ."266 And finally, "the audience appeal of the work turns on
both contributions and 'the share of each in its success cannot be
appraised.'" 26 7However, though this test might prove useful in the film258. Id.
259. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
260. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233.
261. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1884); see also supra
Part I (describing the situation of the "monkey selfie" and the Ellen DeGeneres selfie in which this
rule would be applicable).

262. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at61.
263. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233. These people are contrasted from others that work on
the set:
Everyone from the producer and director to casting director, costumer, hairstylist, and
"best boy" gets listed in the movie credits because all of their creative contributions

really do matter. It is striking in Malcolm X how much the person who controlled the hue
of the lighting contributed, yet no one would use the word "author" to denote that
individual's relationship to the movie. A creative contribution does not suffice to
establish authorship of the movie.

Id.
264. Id. at 1234.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140 F.2d 266,
267 (2d Cir. 1944)).
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making context because of "the plethora of the court's feared 'claimjumping' contributors, it is at odds with the copyrightable contribution
requirement added by the Second and Seventh Circuits," further adding
to the confusion of the joint works doctrine.2 6 8
C.

Consequences of IncorrectlyNaming JointAuthors

As noted in the Subparts above, though the courts try to remain
consistent, most of the time, courts are guessing at what analysis was
meant to accompany the definition of "joint works" in the Copyright
Act. 2 69 As a result, a lot of putative joint authors are spending time and
money to litigate claims that seem as if they have a legal bearing on their
face, only to be told that their contributions are not worth enough to gain
any rights to them. 27 0 It is important that there is a clearer, more precise
test for determining what constitutes joint ownership so as to help
correctly identify joint authors. 2 7 1 Unsurprisingly, authors want to be
recognized for their contributions. 2 72 Part of the reason is psychological:
People want to get acknowledged for their role in creating a
masterpiece. 27 3Economically speaking, however, people also want to be
compensated for their time. 2 74 Being acknowledged and compensated for
one's work not only gives the author satisfaction in the moment, but it
can also lead to more opportunities and success in the future for
that author. 275

Additionally, having a well-defined test will decrease any litigation
between the parties contending to be owners of the work.27 6 David
Slater, the alleged "photographer-tumed-dogwalker," 27 7 had to address
PETA's claim to copyright over multiple years, losing any economic

268. Landau, supra note 129, at 198.
269. See supra Part LI.B (depicting cases in which the joint works doctrine is skewed in
different directions depending on the jurisdiction).
270. See supra Part II.B (discussing cases where there are multiple collaborators to a work,
yet those collaborators are not given equal ownership for their contributions).
271. See Valerie Peterson, What Authors Need to Know About Copyright, BALANCE CAREERS
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/what-is-copyright-and-why-is-it-important-toauthors-2800060 (describing why copyright is important to authors).
272. Sherri Burr, Creating and Selling Films & PrintedDocuments: The Challenge of Joint
Authorship and FirstSale Doctrine, 39 OHIO N.U.L.REV.675,679 (2013).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See generally id. at 679-80 (discussing the impact that acknowledgement has on the
entertainment industry).
276. See Wong, supra note 40 (describing the "years of arcane legal wrangling" Slater has had
to address due to the question of authorship of the monkey selfie).
277. Id. Slater has not yet become a dogwalker, but he is thinking of doing so in order to
provide for himself. Id.
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stability he would have had had there been an optimized way of tackling
the issues presented by the lawsuit. 2 7 8 He cannot afford to replace his
broken camera, compensate the attorney that has been defending him
27 9
Most
since the suit began in 2015, or even pay his income tax bills.
surprising, the issue of ownership in Slater's case is centered around a
photographer and a monkey, which seems to have a simple solution
considering animals do not even have the standing to sue for copyright
ownership, much less can garner the belief that they should have any
type of ownership interest. 2 80 One cannot even begin to fathom the
countless costs that would be associated with a litigation that revolved
281
around two putative human authors in the same situation.
Furthermore, joint authors receive undivided interest in the
copyright, meaning that a joint author is able to do what he or she wants
282
with the copyright rights without the approval of the other. If a coauthor instead licenses the work to another, he or she still has to share
whatever profits stem from the license. 28 3 However, none of the coauthors can grant exclusive rights to any other person or entity without
the agreement of all co-authors, which can be detrimental to forming any
kind of agreement with a publisher, producer, or potential purchaser of
the rights of the joint work. 28 4 Therefore, it is important that the concept
of joint work is applied correctly and comprehensively so as not to shaft
any of the authors, or conversely, so not to provide any of the authors
2 85
with rights they should not have.
IV.

QUIT MONKEYING AROUND: A SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF THE
UNINTENDED COLLABORATOR

Part I discussed a plethora of available approaches used to
distinguish who would be considered a joint author, and as a result, what
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d418,426 (9th Cir. 2017).
281. See, e.g., Jaclyn Peiser, It Took 17 Years: FreelancersReceive $9 Million in Copyright
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/media/freelancers
-digital-copyright-lawsuit.html (describing a copyright infringement suit that took seventeen years
to reach a settlement).
282. Scott Boone, Co-authors, Collaboration, and Joint Authorship - Part I of All That,
WRITER L. (Sept. 5, 2013, 4:03 PM), https://writerinlaw.com/2013/09/05/co-authors-collaborationand-joint-authorship-part-i-of-all-that.
283. Id. For example, if a co-author would like to post a novel online for free, and the other
would like to offer it up for sale, both authors are allowed to take their respective actions. Id.
However, if any profits are made from the sale, half of those profits go to the other co-author by
default. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Peterson, supra note 271.
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would be considered a joint work. 2 8 6 Though there are other notable
cases that further explain courts' interpretation of joint works, 28 7 there is
a clear theme: Each court is estimating the intentions of the 1976
Congress, therefore possibly mistaking which rights really do belong to
which authors. 2 8 8Due to the need for a clear, uniform standard, Subpart
A proposes an amendment to the current Copyright Law that will finally
codify the current jumbled joint work doctrine. 8 It will additionally
illustrate how this amendment would apply to the case of the monkey
selfie, who would be considered an "unintended collaborator."2 90 Subpart
B then discusses possible criticisms of the proposed amendment and
why such criticism will fail upon closer review of the statute. 29 1
A.

ProposedAmendment to the Current CopyrightAct

The proposed amendment below would be added to section 102 of
the current Copyright Law:
(c) In the case of the joint works, copyright protection may extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery if:
(1) There is an actual completed work of authorship that is covered
under the subject matter requirements of subsection (a) of this
section; and
(2) Without the idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery proposed by the putative
co-author, the work of authorship would not exist in its final
completed form. This may be measured by the following factors
which shall be given roughly equal weigh in the corresponding
analysis:
(i) The extent of the collaboration;
(ii) The timing that each contribution occurred;
(iii) The added value of each putative author's contribution
to the final work of authorship; and
(iv) The intent of each author, which shall include both a
286. See supra Part IIA-B.
287. See, e.g., Janky v. Lake Cty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 363 (7th Cir.
2009) (holding that the "doo-wop ditty" was a joint work because the purpose of copyright law
would be defeated if important contributions are denied copyright protection); Gaiman v.
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (arguing that Professor Nimmer's de minimis test
is more in line with the meaning of section 201(a)).
288. See, e.g., supra Part III (considering multiple sources in which courts and commentators
construe the joint works doctrine in different ways); see also Landau, supra note 129, at 211
(suggesting that the courts are misconstruing the statute).
289. See infra Part IV.A.
290. See infra Part IV.A.
291. See infra Part lV.B.
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determination of whether each putative author intended to
contribute to the work of authorship and whether each putative
author believed the work to be a joint work.
(3) However, if there is a contractual or formal agreement in place
at the time the collaboration is set to occur, such contractual or
formal agreement shall be the determining factor in deciding the
rights of each putative author, unless justice so requires
otherwise.292
Each piece of this proposed statute has been inspired by the different
conclusions drawn by commentators and courts alike, yet it is drafted in
such a way as to form a cohesive codification of those conclusions so as
2 93
to limit any undue burden on litigation.
To prove the thoroughness of this amendment, it would be helpful
to apply the amendment to the case of Naruto and the monkey selfie.294
Though, as discussed in Part I, Naruto was the one who pushed the
shutter button on the camera, leading to the infamous picture, it was
2 95
He wanted to acquire
Slater, the photographer, who had the idea.
pictures of the rare creatures, so he packed up his things, flew to
Indonesia, and followed the monkeys around for days, trying to get the
perfect photo.296 He put in the time, the effort, and the preparation-not
to just think about the idea of taking a picture-but to actually put the
idea in motion. 29 7 It was by sheer luck that Naruto was the one that was
able to take the picture.298
Under traditional law, Naruto should have gotten all rights to the
photo due to his act.2 99 However, under the proposed amendment,
Slater's ideas would not automatically be swept to the side as irrelevant
to any copyright claim under section 102(b)." Rather, Slater would be
able to turn to section 102(c) to give him the rights he might deserve for

292. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (illustrating where the proposed
amendment would fit in the existing framework).
293. See supra Part H.A-B (examining conclusions drawn by courts and commentators).
294. See supra Part I (describing the issues regarding the creation of the monkey selfie). For
argument's sake, this application of the amendment will forgo the fact that Naruto is a monkey.
295. See supra Part I.
296. See supra Part I.
297. See supra Part I.
298. See supra PartI.

299.

See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (holding that the

person who physically pressed down on the shutter-button was the author of the photograph and
thereby retained copyright protection of his work).

300.

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Under section 102, Slater's actions

would probably be classified as an "idea" and therefore his contributions would not garner
copyright protection. Id.
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being the brains behind the action . 30 Under section 102(c)(1), it would
be concluded that Slater's idea to take a picture of the macaques actually
resulted in a work of authorship covered under section 102(a)(5).302
Additionally, without Slater's idea to take the photo, that specific photo
would not exist. 3 0 3 Naruto never had the premeditated idea to take a
picture of himself, nor to follow his troop around trying to capture
candid photographs of them.30 4 Therefore, the factors of section
102(c)(2) would be the next step in the analysis. 305
Under section 102(c)(2), all of the factors seem to weigh in Slater's
favor as well. 3 06 He greatly contributed to the work, from working the
angles, to positioning the camera, to spending the grueling hours in the
jungle patiently waiting for the perfect picture.307 Naruto's collaboration
occurred contemporaneously with Slater's vision; Naruto snapped the
picture under the surveillance of Slater.308 Again, the value of Slater's
contributions could be said to outweigh those of Naruto's; circumstances
that can be taken into consideration under this factor are the tests
articulated by Professor Nimmer and Professor Goldstein. 30 9 The
amendment is flexible enough to allow the court to utilize either the de
minimis test or the independent copyrightability test, yet it does not
confine the analysis to these two very fact-specific standards; allowing
in the other facts of the proposed amendment would greatly aid the court
in coming to a fairer conclusion for all parties involved.3 1 0 Finally,
factor (iv) of the proposed amendment, regarding. the intent of the
author, may be subjected to the intent test articulated in Childress,but is
not limited to that test in cases where that standard of intent provides too
narrow a view. 3 1 1 Therefore, in cases like Naruto and Slater's, whether
301. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment).
302. See supra Part IV.A; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (including pictorial works under the
scope of copyright protection).
303. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment); see also Gaiman v. McFarlane,

360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the contributions of both authors could not stand
alone, and without either of their respective contributions, the comic book would not exist).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20 (describing the way in which Naruto was drawn
to the camera lens and fortuitously pressed the shutter button).
305. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment).
306. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43 (describing Slater's efforts in taking the
photos).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
309. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 185, §4.2.1.2; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 172, § 6.07
(describing the way in which Nimmer believes joint authors should be identified).
310. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment in which there are multiple
factors available for the court to assess).

311. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the intent test applied in
this case).
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both putative authors meant to contribute to the photograph may be a
more encouraging analysis than whether both putative authors meant for
3 12
the picture to be a joint work.
Additionally, though not applicable in Naruto and Slater's case,
section 102(c)(3) provides a mechanism by which co-authors working
under a contract cannot sue for more rights than contracted for, thereby
limiting fruitless claims that may arise in the courts.313 Since there was
no contract between monkey and man, under the proposed amendment,
both Slater and Naruto would rightly gain the title of co-author of the
monkey selfie.314
B. Possible Critiques of the ProposedAmendment
The biggest critique to this proposed solution is that the Copyright
Act specifically dictates against allowing ideas to be the basis of a
copyrightable work of authorship. 1 5 However, it cannot be denied that,
in the field of joint ownership, ideas, thoughts, suggestions, and the like
prove to be valuable enough to transform an ordinary work into an
extraordinary work. 3 1 6 Arguably, the most significant purpose of the
Copyright Act is to promote the expression of ideas so that the public
3 17
will have access to innovative work. Why would authors continue to
express their ideas if they are not given their due credit and
compensation for their efforts?3 1 The United States Supreme Court
provided some insight on this inquiry:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's"
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.
If people are consistently denied rights because their contributions
are not technically copyrightable under Childress, for example, people
312. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment).
313. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment). This also maintains the
distinction discussed in the Childress court. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
314. See supra Part IV.A (using the proposed amendment to come to a conclusion regarding
ownership rights).
315. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
316. See supra Part 1I.B (detailing the cases in which the contributions of putative co-authors
transformed the original work of authorship).
317. Valachovic, supra note 115, at 210.
318. Id.
319. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,431-32 (1984).
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will cease discussions in open forums and collaboration will be stilted,
leading to a decrease in the ultimate expression that comes from such
collaboration.20 That might mean that society may have to accept subpar
work from an author with great ideas but atrocious writing skills because
he may risk his right to copyright through uncontracted collaboration. 32 1
Consequently, a fantastic writer may never find his muse because those
with the ideas refuse to participate in a cycle that ultimately leaves them
with no end product and no rights.3 22 The proposed amendment has the
ability to solve these problems in a fair way.323
On that note, the amendment is written this way as to coincide with
the drafting intent behind the 1976 Act. 324 Throughout the legislative
history of the Copyright Act, it is acknowledged that the Act revolved
around one word: broad. 3 25 Congress drafted the Copyright Act with the
knowledge that there would continually be new mediums of expression
and innovative ways of manifesting ideas.326 However, Congress also
recognized that these innovations would be entirely impossible
to foresee:
The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable

technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely
outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither
that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression
within that general area of subject matter would necessarily
be unprotected. 327

Therefore, the statute is broad, not because the 1976 Congress
necessarily wanted to include every and any possible form of expression,
but because it foresaw the possibility that future Congresses-such as
the 2019 Congress that has to consider the effect avenues such as social

320. Valachovic, supra note 115, at 210-11 ("[T]he adoption of an underinclusive [sic] method
of defining joint authorship equally defeats the purpose of the Act.").
321. Cf. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing the ideal
collaborative situation: "This is a typical case from academe. One professor has brilliant ideas but
can't write; another is an excellent writer, but his ideas are commonplace. So they collaborated on
an academic article, one contributing ideas, which are not copyrightable, and the other the prose
envelope, and ...

they sign as coauthors.").

322. Id.
323. See supra Part IV.A (exemplifying how the proposed amendment would solve the
problem Slater and Naruto).
324. See supra Part I.A-B (explaining the intent behind the Copyright Act).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13 (describing the intent behind the Copyright
Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) ("[T]he coverage of the present statute is very
broad . . . .").
326. H.R.REP.NO.94-1476,at5l.
327. Id.
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media have on authorship-may want to incorporate other mediums of
expression under section 102.328
The 1976 Congress was aware that there was the possibility of
technological advancements, and consequently, the expansion in the
interpretation of the Copyright Act to accommodate such
advancement;

32 9

it follows that the 1976 Congress must also have figured

other provisions of the Copyright Act would be affected as well, namely
joint works.330 Had the 1976 Congress wanted joint works to be defined
in a certain way, it would have not only created an explicit standard in
the actual statue, but it would have also explained "joint works" more
33
thoroughly in its extremely extensive and detailed report. 1 The fact that
the 1976 Congress had not done so-nor the fact that the current
Congress has not taken steps to strictly redefine it today-suggests that
the joint works doctrine is open to a broader interpretation than the
federal courts care to allow.3 32 This proposed amendment allows for that
broadened view.133
V.

CONCLUSION

As noted in Part UI, there is no perfect way of defining joint
ownership, 33 4 and yet, joint ownership is becoming an increasingly
prevalent problem in today's modernized society, where the effort to
create something is extremely low, yet the number of collaborators can
be limitless.33 The fact that people have the ability to take out a phone
from their pocket and automatically make-or have someone help them
make 3 36 -a work of authorship completely changes the nature of the
7
copyright game. 33
328. See id. at 52 ("[T]here are unquestionably other areas of existing subject matter that this
bill does not propose to protect that future Congresses may want to.").
329. Id. at 51-52.
330. See id.
331. See generally id.at 120-21 (discussing the interpretation of section 201 and joint works in
a very limited way).
332. Lape, supra note 131, at 44-45. The 12th Street Rag decision provided the impetus for
major legislative efforts to be taken to reshape the current copyright law so as to bypass the
decision, hence, the formulation of the 1976 Act. Id. However, despite the various interpretations of
the joint works doctrine that have occurred since the enactment of the 1976 Act, there has been no
legislative push to narrowly define joint authorship in a certain way through some sort of
codification. Id.
333. See supra Part IV.A.
334. See supra Part III.A-B.
335. See Lape, supra note 131, at 43 ("Increased opportunities for collaborative efforts have
developed during the tenure of the Copyright Act of 1976 in fields such as scientific research, the
computer industry, and the entertainment industry.").
336. See supra Part I (describing the monkey-selfie and the Ellen DeGeneres selfie).
337. See Lape, supra note 131, at 43.Lape describes such an analogous example:
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Therefore, while, for example, the default "pressing-of-the-shutterbutton rule," has been used for over a century, such a rule does not
account for all possible scenarios, nor does it really benefit all parties in
the scenario. 3 3 This Note's solution forms a better foundation for joint
ownership that would ensure all parties and contributions are accounted
for. 3 39 Though Slater and Naruto cannot necessarily use this amendment
to solve their legal issues, the same analysis could be applied to any
issues arising from the analogous situation of the Ellen DeGeneresOscar selfie, hopefully lessening the law's ability to make a monkey out
ofanyone.3 4 0
Sabrina J. Salama*

Let's start with a classic example transposed to a new setting. A contributor posts to a
listserv what looks like a poem, or maybe lyrics. A second subscriber adds a melody and
posts the result. The first or second contributor then markets the song and makes a mint.
Who owns the copyright to the song? Resolution of this question depends upon the
copyright doctrine of joint works, which governs collaborative creation.
Id.
338. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 40 (describing Slater's descent into indigency due to the
extensive litigation surrounding the monkey selfie).
339. See supra Part IV.A.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
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